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Abstract 
In this chapter we discuss some of the problems associated with developing forms of ethical 
oversight in the field of criminology and criminal justice. We argue that the core concerns of 
institutional ethics committees are inextricably bound up with the logic of the market. The 
ongoing marketization of the university is, quite clearly, affecting the production of 
knowledge, and institutional ethics committees now possess an unstated and unacknowledged 
desire to defend the institution from litigation and reputational damage. This desire now 
exhorts a subtle but powerful influence upon the deliberations of institutional ethics 
committees. Using our own research backgrounds and engagement with institutional ethics 
committees as a foundation for our critique, we argue that ethnography, and in situ social 
research more generally, must be protected from those forces that would seek to formalise, 
sanitise and control it.  
 
………………………………………………….. 
   
Key points: 
1. Institutional ethics committees now function to defend the institution from litigation 
and reputational damage. 
2. The consideration of ‘ethics’ – properly defined – actually plays a marginal role in the 
deliberations of ethics committees. 
3. This situation is dissuading, or actively preventing, some social scientists from 
utilising their preferred forms of  research. 
4. The transformation of the ethics committee, and its role in dissuading some forms of 
qualitative research, is already affecting the production of criminological knowledge. 
  
…………………………………………… 
 
 
Introduction: Context 
Criminology has grown enormously in recent years. In Britain the discipline has also recently 
undergone a benchmarking exercise that sought to apply some order and rigor to the materials 
covered within the country’s undergraduate criminology programmes. Criminology, once a 
rag-tag discipline populated by academics with a general interest in crime who had migrated 
to this new shared space from a broad variety of fields - often bringing with them concepts 
and methodologies from across the social sciences and humanities - has become more 
organised and institutionalised, and its once porous and hazily defined boundaries appear to 
have hardened. In Britain, of course, undergraduate criminology degrees have been around 
for some time, and many younger professional criminologists have passed through 
undergraduate criminology programmes. Their educational experience is often quite specific 
to this field. It is clear that we have already passed through a period in which our disciplinary 
history has been codified and reified. It is now endlessly reproduced in textbooks, and no 
longer argued about to any great extent. We might also suggest that with every passing year 
the discipline of criminology displays less and less interest in theory-building and a growing 
preoccupation with empirical data collection, criminal justice practice, crime prevention and 
the management of offenders (Hall et al, 2008). Thorough-going critical accounts of criminal 
motivations and the background to crime certainly form a smaller part of the discipline than 
they once did (Hall, 2012). Political and theoretical truth projects have also declined quite 
markedly (Winlow, 2012), and we might tentatively suggest this decline is closely connected 
to a growth in careerism in the academy generally and the ubiquity of abstract empiricism 
within our discipline specifically (Currie, 2007; Matthews, 2009). 
 
At first glance the discipline appears to be splitting apart into competing factions. However, 
the surface factionalism of criminology is not all it seems. There remains a good deal of 
accord, even between factions that have historically displayed a degree of hostility towards 
each other. There may be brief skirmishes here and there but a genuine clash of ideologies no 
longer takes place on the field of criminology. This is a shame, because without ideological 
commitment there can be no genuine dialectical movement. British criminology has instead 
adopted something of a bunker mentality. Critical criminologists fire the odd salvo at 
administrative criminologists but they cause no damage and nothing changes. Instead, each 
sub-field of criminology appears strangely self-sufficient and there is less and less intellectual 
engagement between them. Those on the left complain about the power and privilege of those 
on the right, but in fact only a tiny number of British criminologists can be identified as being 
adherents of right-wing politics or philosophy. In our times it is the philosophy of liberalism 
that has triumphed, and the monumental scale of its triumph has ensured that liberalism has 
lost much of its original philosophical substance (see Bell, 2014; Hall, 2012). It now stretches 
from the hard-core Randian libertarianism of the right to the interventionist social liberalism 
of the left, and criticism of the overbearing state is as common of criminology’s left wing as 
it is on its right (Matthews, 2014; Winlow et al, 2015). It seems that, for the time being, all 
intellectual skirmishes in criminology will take place on this ‘post-ideological’ landscape (see 
Horsley, 2014). This stark fact should encourage us to acknowledge that beneath our 
discipline’s surface discord lie a range of shared, if often disavowed, political and 
philosophical commitments that bond the discipline together and inform its present condition. 
 
It is entirely possible that the reader will disagree with this brief and partial assessment - 
indeed, we believe that such disagreements should now be aired quite openly in the hope of 
prompting a productive interchange about the future of our discipline - but what we can say 
without fear of contradiction is that criminology is at a crossroads. In our institutions we 
remain locked into hectic schedules of teaching, research and administration. We tend to 
focus on impending deadlines and the range of tasks that structure our working week. As 
space for quiet contemplation and abstract thought diminishes, we tend not to be greatly 
preoccupied with the present trajectory of our discipline or its intellectual health and vitality. 
However, despite the growing gap between the institutional lives of criminologists and the 
broader national and international academic discipline of criminology, there appears to be a 
growing recognition that all is not well and that the future of our discipline may not be as 
rosy as we once imagined.  
 
The drive to generate research income and the considerable pressures of the Research 
Excellence Framework are transforming the working lives of criminologists across Britain. 
The ‘publish or perish’ ethos may have contributed to the expansion of criminology, 
especially in terms of the breadth of topics covered and the mass of data produced, but it has 
also meant that criminologists have less and less time to keep abreast of new developments in 
the field. We are writing more and reading less it seems. There is now a huge variety of 
journals on the market and there has been a staggering growth in the number of criminology 
books published each year. However, there is little sense that a growth in quantity has led to a 
growth in quality, or that, as the discipline steps gingerly into the twenty-first century, new 
truths are being revealed to us.  
 
Throwing out the baby with the bath water   
We want to focus upon one small aspect of this general disciplinary inertia. It is clear that 
empirical research has edged out theory to occupy the core of our discipline. Criminology is 
now teeming with data, and almost all of the bespoke subfields that make up our disciplinary 
mosaic have benefitted from the turn towards empirical research. But despite the considerable 
successes of our empirical research projects, there is a growing sense among social scientists 
– and those orientated to qualitative research in particular – that their work is now being 
impeded by institutional systems of ethical governance. What, we must ask, has changed in 
research governance, and why is there a growing antagonism among researchers towards 
ethics committees? 
 
We should note that, as our discipline began to establish itself during the final third of the 
twentieth century, it rather thoughtlessly followed other social science disciplines in adopting 
models of methodological rigor that owe a great deal to the core methodological concerns of 
the hard sciences (Smart, 2003). Research practice since those days has changed hardly at all, 
but ethical oversight of research practice now seems far tougher and more demanding. 
Perhaps we should conclude that this is no bad thing if problematic research projects are no 
longer slipping through the net, and rigorous oversight is keeping the harms of the research 
process to an absolute minimum. However, despite the nature of our discipline, criminology 
has not proven to be any more ethically problematic than other disciplines in the social 
sciences. Our history is not littered with cases of unethical research practice, and it is not 
immediately clear that the toughening of ethical governance has been a necessary measure 
that has prevented problematic research conduct in criminology (Winlow and Hall, 2012).  
 
It makes sense to conclude that forces external to the discipline have prompted this 
toughening. Under the standard rubric of ‘professionalisation’, the market imperatives that 
have quickly moved to the very heart of the British university system appear, in a very subtle 
and indirect manner, to have prompted our ethics committees to tighten the net in order to 
protect our institutions from litigation and reputational damage. A dull bureaucratised 
pragmatism has taken over and the positive substance that must be retained is seeping out of 
the system at an alarming rate, leaving only a creaking and often alienating administrative 
process that frequently blocks important, challenging or cutting edge research, or places 
significant impediments in front of researchers keen to engage with criminals, deviants or 
marginalised populations in a reasonably naturalistic manner (see Smith, 2014; Ancrum, 
2012). And this is not just a system that impedes working criminologists. Postgraduate and 
undergraduate students are also affected. Often our most talented and intellectually engaged 
undergraduate students are very keen to leave behind the confines of the university and head 
out into the real world to gather their own data for their final year dissertation. In many cases 
this proves to be impossible. The risk averse nature of the institutional ethics committee 
inevitably leads talented students to opt for library-based study, which in turn makes the 
emphasis that is placed on research methods teaching all the more mystifying. All too rarely 
do students get a chance to conduct their own qualitative research, and even those who 
progress to postgraduate study quickly discover that it is now very difficult to gain approval 
for research projects that involve actually meeting and talking to criminals and deviants in 
non-institutional settings.   
 
Let us be clear: we are not claiming that ethnography and qualitative research are on the 
verge of extinction, or that they will play an increasingly marginal role in the production and 
reproduction of criminological knowledge as the discipline moves forward. Rather, we are 
claiming that these methodologies are increasingly deprived of their traditional substance. To 
us, and other qualitative researchers we have consulted, it seems that something is missing, 
and it seems to be missing because ethics committees appeared dedicated to minimising risk 
and sanitising research processes that, in truth, did not need to be sanitised. Many field 
researchers complain about the ethics committee’s drive to control interaction and 
engagement between the researcher and the researched, and its drive to set firm limits and 
how such interactions are brought into being and how they develop over time. Qualitative 
researchers – indeed all researchers who place themselves in what might appear, to the ethics 
committee, to be ‘risky settings’ that might precipitate ‘risky encounters’ – are increasingly 
over-policed, and researchers are understandably keen to avoid breaching the rules handed 
down by ethics committees, and increasingly cautious about their engagement with 
populations considered in some way ‘deviant’. The ethics committee’s drive to 
professionalise research practice, monitor interaction and protect against harm has led to the 
erection of barriers between the researcher and the research subject. Quite clearly, these 
barriers can be negotiated and valuable research can still be done, but we should not dismiss 
the possibility that the intimacies that existed between the researcher and the research subject 
in earlier epochs are a good deal harder to construct and maintain these days. The drive to rid 
the discipline of unethical research practice needs to be placed in an appropriate context, and 
we must avoid meekly accepting ethical governance in its present form as a necessary 
intervention that will eventually lead to beneficial outcomes. Instead we should be bold 
enough to contemplate a more disturbing reality in which we appear to be throwing out the 
baby with the bathwater.   
 The Practice of Ethics Committees 
Within our discipline there is a broad agreement that steps should be taken to ensure that our 
research practice does not harm participants and that researchers are not exposed to 
unnecessary danger (see, for example, the British Society of Criminology, 2006), but many 
criminologists also feel these important considerations are no longer of paramount 
importance to our institutional ethics committees. Other concerns that appear to have little to 
do with ‘ethics’ have begun to sneak in and progressively work their way closer to the centre, 
and the traditional activities associated with ethical oversight have been marginalised or 
forgotten entirely. When presenting our own work to institutional ethics committees, we have 
encountered there what might be termed a lawyer’s mentality that appears to operate within 
an essentially administrative and managerialist culture that encourages the various academics 
who gather under its auspices to grind their way through the agenda while sifting and sorting 
research proposals into piles of ‘the approved’ and ‘the disapproved’; the consideration of 
ethics, properly understood, nowhere to be seen. Can the committee envisage a situation in 
which the researcher witnesses or becomes aware of criminal acts? Is there any possibility 
that the research might threaten an individual’s legal entitlements or those of a business entity 
or organisation? If there is a chance that research might be conducted in or on privately-
owned property, have the necessary permissions been sought? Is there any chance that this 
research might threaten the reputation of the university? These are the questions that appear 
most often to inform the committee’s deliberations.  
 
In our view, the rubric of ‘informed consent’ appears to have become something of a panacea 
for ethics committees, or at least those forced to engage with the thorny problems that 
accompany qualitative and in situ research proposals in the field of criminology. Forms 
outlining the aims and outcomes of the research project, and the rights of the research 
participant in relation to it, must be signed by each contact before data-gathering can 
commence. On the surface of things we might, with some justification, claim that the 
increased focus upon ‘informed consent’ reflects a growing concern for the rights of research 
participants. However, some qualitative researchers we have spoken to doubt that the 
requirements of ‘informed consent’ are truly altruistic and reflect a genuine desire to ensure 
that no harm comes to research participants. Instead, they take the view that beneath this 
surface positivity lies a darker motivation. This motivation is never fully revealed, but its 
influence can be detected across the new terrain of research management. The pragmatism of 
the market, and its concern with the bottom line, is subtly working its magic, disturbing 
traditional cultures and enforcing new logics of managerialism, professionalization and 
oversight. Beneath the surface of concern for participants lies a powerful desire to ensure that 
nothing returns to harm the interests of the institution.  
 
What, we must ask, are the institutional and ideological roles of ethics committees, and how 
are ethics committees shaping the research produced within our discipline? How might the 
new rigors of ethical oversight be affecting the production of criminological knowledge? 
How do ethics committees reach their decisions, and do forthright discussions of ethics – 
properly understood – play any role at all in these deliberations? Who sits on ethics 
committees, and how might the background, fieldwork experience and social identities of 
members inform the practice of these committees? Are members ‘socialised’ into the 
committee’s normative practice, and, as they become inured to this new reality, might the 
bonds that connect committee members to more esoteric – but hugely important – questions 
about what is good and right begin to loosen? Does the ethics committee member, keen to get 
out of another boring meeting as quickly as possible, simply reapply an already-in-place logic 
rooted in expediency, compliance with the law and protecting the institution from any kind of 
negative attention? Has the contemplation of ethics been formalised and bureaucratised or has 
the contemplation of ethics been entirely withdrawn, replaced only with a malign institutional 
pragmatism?  
 
What concerns us most is that ‘ethics’, and ‘ethical governance’, have gradually become a 
system of external control that enforces a prescribed set of rules that relate to research 
practice. Inevitably, when ‘ethics’ exists as an external - rather than an internal - system of 
governance, the researcher is forced to engage with it as such. Submitting a research proposal 
to an ethics committee is relegated to the status of a mere administrative task, a hurdle we 
must overcome before the researcher is allowed to get on with the real work. This gradual 
transformation is far more important and negativistic than we might imagine. The ethics 
committee as a system of governance, a regulator that determines what is and is not allowed, 
encourages researchers to engage with it in an essentially sociopathic manner. The researcher 
is encouraged to say the right things and tick the right boxes, to acknowledge the rules and 
promise to abide by them. The researcher must ask, what will the ethics committee make of 
this or that? Does my proposal break the rules in any way? What should I write in my 
research proposal that might encourage the committee to look favourably upon it? Of course, 
there has always been a clear division between the initial research proposal and the actual 
lived research project, but as the researcher becomes increasingly conversant with the 
demands of the ethics committee, and learns how to ‘play the game’, this division becomes 
increasingly stark. The research proposal is simply an administrative task that must be 
completed, and the researcher knows that it is in his or her best interests to present research 
plans in a particular way. Like the stereotypical sociopath, the researcher knows the rules, 
and knows that it is in his or her interests to live by them. However, like the sociopath, these 
rules remain only external rules that are imposed upon and seek to regulate the subject. They 
are not absorbed or used as a determining structure in our mental life, forming part of what 
we call our conscience, the ‘voice in our heads’ that constantly reminds us to abide by the 
rules of our community. When our postgraduate students contact us about ethical matters, 
they often pitch their questions in this rather disconcerting manner. What will the ethics 
committee say about this or that? What are the ‘rules’ when faced with this particular kind of 
ethical problem? Of course, during research, when one is faced with challenging events, the 
proper response is to think and respond in relation to one’s own conscience and embodied 
ethics. One should ask, is such a thing right or wrong, rather than, what are the rules that 
govern research practice when faced with such a dilemma? Of course, in the well-adjusted 
individual, all of this should happen immediately. We should respond morally to the world as 
we encounter it. We should think, what is the right thing to do, and then do it, rather than 
suspending judgement until one has had an opportunity to consult the rules and regulations. A 
worrying gap is opening up between the ethics committee, which acts as a regulatory agency, 
and our own research practice, which of course should be constantly monitored by our own 
embodied ethics, our own independent sense of what is right and wrong. In order to advance 
this argument, it seems necessary to step back a little and consider other issues connected to 
the governance of research practice in criminology.  
 
Ethnography must be defended 
What do we mean by the phrase ‘value free’ social research? How can social research be 
‘value free’ and at the same time completely in-keeping with value-laden conceptions of 
appropriate research conduct (see Ancrum, 2012)? How can we remain set apart from the 
world while at the same time subject to normative models of moral social engagement (see 
Smith, 2014; Ellis, 2015)? Of course, during methods training criminologists are instructed to 
remain objective and value-free despite the fact that it is impossible for a human being to 
accomplish this task without lapsing into psychosis (see Gouldner, 1962; Roberts, 1981; 
Stanley and Wise, 2002). Political and ideological commitments are believed to contaminate 
our empirical studies. Because we cannot dispense with such commitments, we are forced to 
deny their existence and pretend that, upon entering the field, we were magically able to 
transform ourselves into apolitical and ahistorical automatons able to appraise reality 
objectively, and, when data-gathering is complete, that we possess the magical ability to free 
ourselves from established commitments in order to interpret our data honestly and in a way 
that identifies a fundamental truth free from the contaminants of our established social 
identities.  
 
Criminology is a discipline that exists at the forefront of ethical condemnation. Our subject 
matter is inherently contentious as it references some kind of rupture in the moral, ethical or 
regulatory foundations of our world. Because our discipline proceeds from this base, there 
exists a powerful imperative to ensure that our research sticks rigidly to established ethics 
frameworks. Of course, in order to remain faithful to the concerns upon which the discipline 
was founded, we must engage with criminals of all kinds: We must speak to drug users and 
dealers, rapists and paedophiles, rioters and terrorists, fraudsters and racists, and many other 
criminal or deviant groups, and, if we remain committed to working through the complexities 
of motivation, drive and causation, it is beneficial to talk with our respondents in situ, in non-
custodial settings and in places where they feel sufficiently relaxed, safe and willing to open 
up to a researcher. We must also note that the vast majority of criminals actively attempt to 
conceal their crimes. Even when criminals are caught and incarcerated they may continue to 
disguise the reality of their deeds to interested academics. Observing deviant populations in 
action and talking to criminals who are actively engaged in criminal markets is therefore of 
huge value. We should be fighting hard to resuscitate the dying art of ethnography, especially 
those forms of ethnography that seek to capture the realities of culture in action. The ethics 
committee’s drive to regulate research practice means that increasingly only those forms of 
ethnography go ahead that can work in accordance with its rules. Can the ethnographer 
conduct informed consent procedures? Will every research participant be equipped with the 
knowledge to make informed decisions? Of course, observing criminals and deviants in situ 
opens up a host of methodological and ethical dilemmas, but rather than address these in a 
reasonably considered manner, the clear ideological orientation of the ethics committee is to 
construct hard boundaries on what is and isn’t allowed, and then force researchers to live with 
its decisions.  
 
Certainly, many ethnographic accounts of deviant populations operate within an essentially 
appreciative ideological frame (see for example, Becker, 1963; Young 1971) that encourages 
readers to reconsider the role of power in the construction of law and order and in social 
conceptions of deviance and normalcy. Perhaps we could do more to move beyond cultural 
appreciation and develop more realistic ethnographic accounts of criminal and deviant 
cultures (Hall and Winlow, 2015), but the benefits of ethnography as a method should be 
quite clear. Forthright, truth-seeking qualitative research is integral to the health of our 
discipline. The attempts made by ethics committees to regulate ethnographic research 
practice inevitably impact upon the data we gather. Some populations of great interest to 
criminologists are quite unwilling to talk honestly and openly to a researcher brandishing a 
recording device and official-looking documents, and this is especially true when the 
researcher asks for a signature and hopes to discuss the involvement of that population in 
crime and deviance. However, a talented and generally unencumbered ethnographer who 
presents herself as a fully human presence, possessed of her own identity and views and 
willing to engage in open-ended discussion, might just manage to elicit genuinely 
illuminating information from hard-to-reach research populations. This requires time and 
effort and a willingness to leave the world of the university behind. It requires the researcher 
to respond to the world as she encounters it rather than constantly worrying whether she has 
transgressed the rules. Here, the requirements handed down by the ethics committee act as a 
significant impediment to those forms of ethnographic research practice that used to be quite 
common in sociological criminology. Ethnography continues of course, but, we claim, it is 
vital that we wrestle with the possibility that it does so despite new regulatory measures. The 
ethics committee’s drive to regulate research practice in order to mitigate harm brings with it 
a general reduction in the human intimacy that makes ethnography such a vital research 
methodology for the social sciences.  
 
Criminology at a crossroads 
If we are to prevent criminology’s gradual slide into ‘controlology’ (Ditton, 1979), it seems 
to us important to reconnect criminology to its principle objects of crime and harm. We need 
to know what they are and why they occur. Already too much of our discipline is concerned 
with the aftermath of crime: the response of the media, the response of the police and the 
criminal justice system, the response of the victim and the victim’s community, and so on. 
These things are of considerable importance, but with every passing year British criminology 
appears marginally less interested in the actual causes of crime and harm, as if all that can be 
said about such things has already been said, and so the discipline can leave behind its 
traditional objects in order to construct research-informed demands for more a 
comprehensive system of human rights and a more civilised criminal justice system (see Hall 
and Winlow, 2015). We should be doing all we can to encourage ambitious and energetic 
postgraduate students to engage with real life as it is lived by populations of interest to 
criminology. Instead we tend to treat institutional ethics committee as a regrettable 
inevitability. Researchers across the land complain in private but tend to go along with the 
process of applying for ethical clearance, despite the fact that they have little or no faith in the 
ethics committee to form reasonable judgements. Tales of the staggering naivety and the 
breath-taking stupidity of ethics committees are quite common when one broaches the topic 
of ethical governance with active field researchers. Almost all of the qualitative researchers 
we’ve talked to had a tale to tell. In the pages that follow we will report upon our own 
research experiences among criminal and deviant populations of various kinds.  
 
Both of the authors of this paper, when about to undertake research with deviants and law-
breakers, have been repeatedly asked by members of institutional ethics committees if they 
intended to inform the police of any illegality they may encounter during their studies. 
Winlow (2001) was encouraged to use consent forms in a project that involved interviewing 
young men involved in the sale and distribution of cocaine and ecstasy (see also Winlow and 
Hall, 2006), and Measham was encouraged to use consent forms when observing clubbers 
consuming dance drugs (see Measham et al 2011). Amazingly, Measham was asked by her 
institutional ethics committee to inform the police if she saw any actual drug consumption in 
nightclubs populated almost entirely by people who had taken drugs. This request was 
particularly mindboggling, given that the police themselves were fully aware that the venue 
was frequented by drug-users. Indeed, the police knew about and actively supported the 
research, and were forward-thinking enough to see the value in research that was geared 
towards identifying opportunities to prevent harm. Don’t cases such as this indicate that the 
principal concern of ethics committees is simply to enforce the rules rather than engage with 
individual research proposals in a reasonably intelligent fashion? Quite clearly, there often 
exists a huge disconnect between the world of the criminologist and the institutional work of 
the ethics committee. This gap is important and revealing. At least part of the problem stems 
from the multi-disciplinary nature of ethics committees and the lack of knowledge or 
understanding academics working in other disciplines often have of criminology. Of course, 
many foundational works in criminology and the sociology of deviance evolved in a 
naturalistic and unruly manner and yet still managed to produce illuminating data and 
transformative theory. These researchers were not required to inform the police if they 
happened to witness a crime, and nor were they encouraged to conduct elaborate consent 
procedures before engaging with research participants (consider, for example, Thrasher, 
1927; Polsky, 1967; Young, 1971). Somehow they managed to muddle through, and the 
results were positive. To the best of our knowledge no great harms accrued. The past of our 
discipline is not a barbarous past we should attempt to leave behind as we make our way 
inexorably to a civilizational ideal in which all the foibles and risks of human relationships 
have been removed. Qualitative social research forms an important part of our shared 
disciplinary past and we should do all we can to maintain a connection to it and ensure that it 
is not policed out of existence. 
 
When conducting covert work as a nightclub doorman, it was imperative for Winlow (see 
Winlow, 2001; Winlow et al. 2001; Hobbs et al, 2003) to actively assume that identity and 
become involved in all of the incidents that fall within the remit of nightclub doormen. Of 
course, doormen, landlords and private security firms have nothing to gain by allowing a 
criminologist to assume such a role within their cultures. We can, of course, interview 
doormen and ask them about their occupational culture and their involvement in violent 
incidents, but becoming immersed in their culture, witnessing and reporting upon the 
actuality of violent incidents, and, essentially, ‘seeing the world as they see it’ (Berger, 
1972), produces data of an entirely different order. Of course, things that are mundane and 
uninteresting to a nightclub doorman can be illuminating for a social researcher. Such events 
are often missing from interview data as foreground action tends to dominate conversation. 
Being there in the flesh can provide the observer with insights that would be unforthcoming if 
other methodologies were used. In interviews, for example, one might ask a doorman what 
happened on a particular evening at work. Often doormen will reply with ‘nothing much’, or 
‘it was another boring night’. Of course, their assessment is based upon their own experience 
of their work and the environment in which they conduct their work. However, when the 
bouncer says ‘nothing happened’, he is in fact quite wrong. ‘Something’ did happen, even if, 
from the bouncer’s point of view, it was not particularly interesting (see Hobbs et al, 2003). 
For social researchers keen to accurately capture the social scene, accessing this hidden 
reality means that one must go deeper into the researched community.  
 
Measham recently undertook 200 hours of ethnographic observation in Soho, London, 
between the hours of 6pm to 4am, across twenty consecutive nights. The study, funded by 
Westminster Council (see Hadfield et al, 2014), sought to investigate the benefits and costs of 
the night time economy in Soho. Her presence on the street from dusk till dawn in all 
weathers allowed her the opportunity to get to know the characters who inhabited the area 
after dark – the touts, dealers, sex workers, homeless drinkers, beggars, taxi drivers, rickshaw 
cyclists, pickpockets and flower sellers – those who lingered long after the customers had left 
the theatres, bars and nightclubs. Over the course of the fieldwork she was able to build up a 
rapport with these various street inhabitants and begin to hear their stories. These various 
nocturnal habitués grew to trust her and gradually became willing to confide in her. Measham 
exposed herself to significant personal risks, and she witnessed or became aware of a wide 
range of crimes. However, it is only by taking on these challenges that we can access the rich 
data that in situ research can yield. It is only by developing personal relationships with groups 
of interest to criminologists that we can begin to refine our understanding of complex issues 
that lie beneath mere verbal recollections of the social scene. And, of course, if Measham had 
informed the police every time she witnessed or heard about a crime, her research project 
would have been over just as it was beginning to get underway. Conducting research projects 
of this kind takes time, and they are not without risk. However, there is no ‘ethical’ reason 
why we should effectively close off participant observation to researchers keen to take on the 
challenges of engaging with the world in this way (see Ancrum, 2012).  
 
Of course many criminal groups remain almost totally inaccessible to criminological 
researchers. In such instances it may be necessary to use covert methods to generate data, and 
it is at this point that we need the thoughtful and considered judgement of our peers to 
determine how far the researcher can or should go in search of criminological knowledge. It 
is quite obviously counter-productive to deny ourselves knowledge of reality because 
researching that reality may necessitate the use of covert methods. We completely refute the 
suggestion that covert methods are necessarily unethical and in every instance harm the 
researched community. Of course, by demanding that all ethnographers utilise consent 
procedures the ethics committee is engaged in a subtle process of eradicating covert 
ethnography. When used judiciously, covert ethnography has great utility for criminology. It 
is only in the current context of panoramic liberalism – in which we assume that denying 
individuals all available information is necessarily ‘unethical’ – that we have formed the view 
that covert research is wrong and must be dispensed with. Perhaps more than any other 
methodology covert ethnography has the capacity to reveal hidden worlds. It enables the 
criminological community to leave behind the confines of the campus and become conversant 
with the lifeworlds of our most marginalised communities. However, in British criminology it 
has almost disappeared. 
 Other forms of qualitative research are also under pressure. Today virtually all researchers 
who engage with human subjects are required to use consent forms. These forms usually 
outline the research project, describe how the words of the interviewee will be used, indicate 
that the interviewee can withdraw from the interview at any time, and provide the interviewee 
with contact information for a supervisor working at the university who they can contact if 
they feel uncomfortable about what has taken place. In many respects this process is 
unproblematic, but we should also note that such formalities immediately disturb social 
behaviour and deprive it of a degree of authenticity. If we are interviewing probation officers, 
an occupational group with direct experience of bureaucracy and with little to lose when 
engaging with academic researchers, then it’s likely that their commentary will not be hugely 
affected by the presence of consent forms. However, if we are interviewing violent criminals 
in a non-custodial setting, and if we intend to ask them about their own involvement in 
violent crime, then the consent procedure quite clearly has the potential to disrupt and 
potentially ruin the research project. Of course, some research contacts cannot read and write 
and feel ill-at-ease in the presence of such forms. They are uncomfortable with ‘authority’ as 
most of their encounters with it have been negative. They have encountered forms in police 
stations and prisons, and associate such formalities with those settings. What chance does the 
researcher have of getting a violent criminal to talk honestly and openly about his crimes in 
such circumstances?  
 
In the example alluded to above, Measham applied for ethical approval for annual surveys, 
ethnographic observations and stakeholder interviews in South London gay clubs as part of 
her broader portfolio of research on dance drug use in dance music venues. The project 
hinged on a decision by a university ethics committee to demand the written informed 
consent of every customer in a nightclub (which often held around 1000) before the project 
could be granted ethical approval and data collection could go ahead. Of course, the 
management of the nightclub would have immediately withdrawn its support for the research 
if such a strategy was adopted, and the research project would then have to be abandoned. It 
would be almost impossible to go through a consent procedure with one thousand clubbers in 
the space of one night, and totally impossible to do this before moving on to the actual 
business of researching drug-users and club-goers. And, of course, those attending the venue 
had no interest in such matters. They wanted to get into the club as quickly as possible so that 
they could enjoy their night out. Forcing clubbers to go through this procedure would’ve 
ensured many club-goers simply disengaged and went elsewhere. To complicate matters 
further still, this was a nightclub popular with men who have sex with other men. 
Understandably, many of the club’s patrons would have been unwilling to leave a record that 
they had been in attendance. An absurd judgement by an ethics committee keen to enforce the 
rules almost destroyed a research project that held great promise. Edicts such as this indicate 
quite clearly just how detached some ethics committees are from the actual business of social 
scientific research.  
 
Ethics committees with a little more experience in dealing with research proposals put 
forward by criminologists often accept that, in such circumstances, a verbal consent 
procedure can be used instead of the usual forms. In verbal consent procedures the researcher 
simply talks through the content of the consent form and outlines for the interviewee key 
points of note. Again, this can work, but it can also alienate respondents and encourage them 
to withdraw. When conducting ethnographic work with violent offenders (Winlow), or with 
customers in the night time economy (Measham), a huge amount of effort is needed simply to 
get the respondent into a position where it is possible to ask research-based questions. The 
researcher needs the interviewee to feel comfortable with his or her presence. If the 
researcher then pulls out a recording device and adopts the formal language of the university, 
events can quickly take a turn for the worse. And further, we should not simply assume that it 
will be easy to come across another research contact of this type. Many ethnographers 
conduct interviews as part of their broader projects, and snowball sampling is often used to 
develop a workable sample. The ethnographer needs gatekeepers. He or she needs to develop 
and maintain workable relationships with key contacts. Even verbal consent procedures have 
the potential to impede data gathering and disrupt budding research relationships. 
 
Understandably enough, many active criminals distrust those who carry forms and ask for 
signatures. They have learnt to clam up when faced with individuals from an alien culture 
who talk about research projects, outputs and complaints procedures. It is not that the 
interviewee’s initial reticence cannot be overcome, but considerable effort needs to be 
applied to maintain affective research relationships in the presence of such formalities, and 
inevitably some research contacts will find the process too off-putting and decide to withdraw 
or otherwise withhold information. Our claim is not that research that fully subscribes to the 
logic of fully informed consent has little value. Such research can be of considerable use. 
However, we must accept that covert participant observation, or ethnographic research that 
bypasses the formalities of informed consent procedures, is better suited to capturing 
something approaching authenticity, or at least a reality less disturbed by the presence of a 
researcher.    
 
Conclusion: Towards an embodied professional ethics 
To us it seems obvious that criminologists must mount a determined campaign to defend 
ourselves against forces that have the potential to curtail the production of criminological 
knowledge. We must defend qualitative and in situ research methodologies and fight for the 
right to engage with the world as we find it. We must do all we can to ensure that, as much as 
possible, market pragmatism is dispensed with and proper ethical consideration of research 
problems becomes the focus of attention.  
 
Research questions 
1. According to the authors, how has the institutional ethics committee changed in recent 
years? 
2. How might informed consent procedures, both written and verbal, disrupt 
ethnographic research encounters? 
 
Case example: 
“Gordon… begins to kick the man and is joined in this by Frankie and Matty. They aim kicks 
at the man’s head, the way you would shape up to strike a football with utmost force. Frankie 
is swearing, calling the man a bastard. I see the man role into the foetus position and cover 
his head with his hands. Matty… is also swearing and is now raising his foot to stamp on the 
man’s head. Frankie and Matty, and now Kevin, kick the man for a while longer and then 
ease up for a moment. The wounded man, lying on the ground, has stopped moving and I 
consider seriously the possibility that they’ve killed him. However, he then sparks back into 
life, rolls onto his other side, re-covers his head and the kicking recommences. Against all 
instinct I tell the men to stop. I don’t want to, but I feel compelled. I know what doing this 
can mean. I am not naïve about what these men can do. My stomach is turning as I say, leave 
him alone, he’s had enough… The Monday following this incident I was in the more 
comfortable confines of Durham University. I spoke to my supervisor and we agreed it was 
time to start negotiating my withdrawal from the field” (Winlow, 2001: 157-159). 
Questions: 
1. For the researcher, what was the most ethical course of action in this case? 
2. Can there ever be a reasonable justification for conducting covert research among 
criminal groups of this sort?  
3. If covert research is judged fundamentally ‘unethical’, how will this judgement affect 
the production of criminological knowledge? 
 
Summary 
In this chapter we have argued that institutional ethics committees are now less concerned 
with ‘ethics’ than they are with defending the institution from possible litigation and negative 
attention and commentary. The infiltration of market concerns into the realm of ethical 
deliberation has the potential to shift the trajectory of British criminology and deprive 
generations of scholars forms of knowledge that spring from participant observation, covert 
ethnography and other forms of qualitative and in situ social research.   
 
Key readings: 
Measham, F., Wood, D., Dargan, P. and Moore, K. (2011), ‘The Rise in Legal Highs: 
Prevalence and patterns in the use of illegal drugs and first and second generation ‘legal 
highs’ in south London gay dance clubs’, Journal of Substance Use, 16 (4): 263-272. In this 
article Measham and colleagues discuss their work in south London dance clubs and reflect 
upon some of the problems associated with generating data in such a setting. 
 
Winlow, S. and Hall, S. (2012) ‘What is an ‘Ethics Committee’? Academic Governance in an 
Epic of Belief and Incredulity’, British Journal of Criminology, 52 (2):  400-416. In this 
article, using Lacanian psychoanalysis, Winlow and Hall offer a critique of postmodernism, 
the marketization of the university and contemporary institutional ethics committees.  
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